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RYAN MOOERS AND DARRON LAVEN BECKER, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, and State v. 
Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173 (Addendum A).  This Court 
consolidated the cases pursuant to rule 3(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  The Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(5) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
 After Mooers burglarized a home and Becker struck his neighbor 
with a shovel, they negotiated pleas in abeyance with the State to avoid 
convictions and sentences for felonies.  In return, Mooers and Becker had 
only to attend a class, pay a fee, and pay restitution to their victims.  Their 
-2- 
plea in abeyance agreements did not specify a sum certain for restitution, 
but left that determination to the trial court.    
 Mooers and Becker ultimately disagreed with the trial courts’ 
restitution determinations and appealed to the court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals dismissed Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals, holding that because 
their pleas in abeyance were not final orders, the court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider them.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Did the court of appeals err in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Mooers’s and Becker’s direct appeals from restitution entered as 
conditions of their non-final pleas in abeyance? 
 Standard of Review.   Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness.  Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35, ¶8, __ Utah 
Adv. Rep. __.   
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum B:  
 Utah R. App. P. 3 (appeal as of right) 
 Utah R. App. P. 5 (discretionary appeals from interlocutory 
orders) 
 Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (judgments) 
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 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-1 (West Supp. 2012) (plea in 
abeyance definitions) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-2 (West Supp. 2012) (plea in 
abeyance terms) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3 (West Supp. 2012) (entry of plea 
in abeyance) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-4 (West Supp. 2012) (violation of 
plea in abeyance) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-18a-1 (West Supp. 2012) (appeals—
when proper) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2012) (crime 
victims restitution act definitions) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2012) (restitution 
criteria) 
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-401 (West Supp. 2012) (entry of 
restitution judgment) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
A. State v. Mooers. 
1. Summary of facts. 
 One November, a family went on a week-long vacation.  See mR.2.  
When they returned, they discovered that their home had been burglarized.  
See mR.2; mR.138:14.  The burglars had entered the home through daughter 
Randi’s bedroom window, scattering “glass everywhere.” mR.138:5, 13-14.  
                                              
1 Because this case has been consolidated by the Court’s order, there 
are two records on appeal:  the record of State v. Mooers and the record of 
State v. Becker.  To avoid confusion, the State cites to the record in Mooers as 
mR.__ and the record in Becker as bR.__.   
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Randi’s carpet had been torn and ripped from the broken window glass and 
her belongings were strewn around.  See mR.128:6; mR.138:8.  Several of the 
family’s items were missing from throughout the home.  See mR.138:8, 13.  
The family estimated that the burglars had stolen $3,200 in jewelry and 
coins.  See mR.2.     
 After the break-in, Randi “was terrified” and “didn’t feel safe 
anymore.”  mR.138:7, 16.  She became withdrawn, would “shake,” and 
experienced nightmares.  mR.138:16.  And if someone “walked into the 
room unexpectedly,” she would “jump halfway out of her skin.”  
mR.138:17.      
 Randi was also too afraid to sleep in her bedroom and she began 
sleeping on the couch.  See mR.138:8, 15.  Randi, in fact, would not go into 
her bedroom at all except to “grab [her] clothes in the morning” and only if 
her mother accompanied her.  Id. at 11, 15.    
 Approximately one month after the break-in, Randi’s parents decided 
that “the only thing [they] could do” to ease Randi’s distress was to install 
security bars on her window.  mR.138:16; mR.132 n.2.  Indeed, after the 
security bars were installed, Randi “got much better.”  mR.138:17.  She “felt 
safer” and returned to sleeping in her own bedroom.  mR.138:9.      
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 After an investigation, Mooers and a co-defendant were charged for 
their involvement in the break-in.  See mR.1-2, mR.138:2.  Mooers was 
charged with burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a third degree 
felony.  See mR.1-2.   
 Mooers negotiated a plea in abeyance agreement with the State.  
According to the agreement, Mooers agreed to plead guilty to third-degree-
felony theft, and the State would dismiss the more serious burglary charge.  
See mR.15, 24; mR.137:1.  The trial court would hold the plea in abeyance for 
18 months.  See id.  If Mooers successfully fulfilled certain plea in abeyance 
conditions, the theft charge would also be dismissed and Mooers would not 
have any conviction.  See mR.137:5-6; Utah Code Annotated §77-2a-3(2) 
(West Supp. 2012).   
 As conditions of his plea in abeyance, Mooers agreed to complete a 
theft class, pay a $200 fee, and pay restitution jointly and severally with his 
co-defendant.  See mR.15, 24; mR.137:5-6; mR.138:1-2.  The plea in abeyance 
agreement did not provide how much restitution Mooers would be required 
to pay. Instead it stated that the State would “submit” its figure to the trial 
court within 90 days of Mooer’s plea.  See mR.137:5; mR.15, 24.   
 At his plea hearing, Mooers admitted that he “aided others in 
entering a home and taking coin[s] and jewelry worth between $1,500 and 
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$5,000.”  mR.22; mR.137:3.  The trial court accepted Mooer’s plea, but did 
not enter it, instead holding it in abeyance for 18 months.  See mR.15; 
mR.137:5.  Following the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement, the trial 
court ordered Mooers to complete a theft class, pay a fee, and pay 
restitution jointly and severally with his co-defendant.  mR.137:6; mR.15.  
The trial court “g[a]ve the State 90 days to determine the restitution” 
amount.  mR.137:6.  The trial court advised Mooers that if he failed to fulfill 
these conditions, it “would mean you would come back here and the guilty 
plea would be entered and you would be sentenced.”  mR.137:5.     
 Following the plea hearing, the State requested $5,760.50 in 
restitution—about $260 more than Mooers had already admitted he owed.  
See mR.38, 110-127.  Of this amount, $4,660.50 was for the value of the stolen 
jewelry and coins, repairing Randi’s broken window, and replacing Randi’s 
damaged carpet.  See mR.116-125, 131.  The remaining $1,100 was for 
installing security bars on Randi’s bedroom window.  See id. 
 Mooers objected to restitution for the security bars, asserting that they 
were not “‘pecuniary damages’ resulting from Defendant’s ‘criminal 
activity’” as required by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. mR.71; 
mR.128:4-7, 11-12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201).    
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 The trial court disagreed.  See mR.131-135.  After an evidentiary 
hearing and considering both oral and written argument, it ordered Mooers 
to pay “for all of the pecuniary damages arising from the break-in,” 
“including the installation of security bars.”  mR.135.   
 Mooers appealed the trial court’s restitution award for the security 
bars.  See mR.101.   
2.  The court of appeals’ decision. 
 In a unanimous opinion, the court of appeals held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s appeal.  See State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 
266, ¶¶10, 19, 362 P.3d 282 (Addendum A).  While the court agreed that 
defendants, “as a matter of right,” may appeal a final judgement of 
conviction, it recognized that under well-established precedent, “a plea in 
abeyance is neither a sentence nor a final judgment, and therefore does not 
give rise to a right to appeal.”  Id. at ¶¶8, 10 (citing Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, 
359 P.3d 592; State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Millward, 
2014 UT App 174, 332 P.3d 400; Salzl v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2005 
UT App 399, 122 P.3d 691; State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1997) 
(per curiam)).   
 The court of appeals further rejected Mooers’s contention that a 
restitution order—entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance—is 
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independently appealable.  Id. at ¶¶11-17.  To the extent that State v. Gibson, 
2009 UT App 108, 208 P.3d 543, or Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, 359 P.3d 592, 
suggested such a right, the court of appeals dismissed its language as non-
binding dicta because neither case addressed whether a restitution order 
entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance was directly appealable. See id. 
at ¶¶12-14 (explaining that Gibson reviewed trial court’s denial of motion to 
withdraw guilty plea and Meza addressed whether successfully completed 
plea in abeyance agreement is treated as conviction for purposes of Post-
Conviction Remedies Act).  
 Recognizing that statutes which treat pleas in abeyance as convictions 
do so only “explicitly,” the court of appeals also determined that the Crime 
Victims Restitution Act did not create a right to directly appeal a restitution 
order entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance agreement.  Id. at ¶15.  
The Act’s provision that a restitution order be “‘considered a legal 
judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure’” did not 
create such a right because it “does not refer to the right to appeal, nor does 
it indicate that a restitution order is considered a conviction for purposes of 
appeal.”  Id. at ¶¶16-17 (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-401(2) 
(LexisNexis 2012)).  Instead, this provision simply created a mechanism for 
victims to enforce the payment of restitution.  Id. at ¶17.    
-9- 
 The court of appeals finally noted that defendants who are ordered to 
pay restitution as a condition of a plea in abeyance are not without an 
avenue for seeking appellate review.  Id. at ¶18.  It observed that they can 
request interlocutory review pursuant to rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure or they can request extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. 
B. State v. Becker. 
1. Summary of facts. 
 Angry that his neighbor Mr. Turner’s dogs were off-leash, Becker ran 
after Mr. Turner with a shovel, yelling obscenities and threatening to kill 
him.  See bR.2, 73, 79.  Becker hit Mr. Turner with the shovel twice—once in 
the throat and once in the head.  See bR.2, 73, 82.  Becker then pinned Mr. 
Turner against a fence.  See bR.74, 76, 77.  Mr. Turner escaped only after 
neighbors intervened.  See bR.74, 82.   
 A responding officer noted that Mr. Turner had injuries on the top of 
his head as well as scratches and marks on his neck and a bleeding cut on 
his hand.  See bR.2, 81.  As the officer placed Becker under arrest, he 
continued to yell about Mr. Turner and his dogs.  See bR.2, 82.   
 Becker was charged with aggravated assault, a third degree felony.  
See bR.1.  Like Mooers, Becker negotiated a plea in abeyance with the State.  
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Becker agreed to plead guilty to attempted aggravated assault, a class A 
misdemeanor, with the understanding that the trial court would hold the 
plea in abeyance for 24 months.  See bR. 26, 28; bR.99:6.  In return, Becker 
agreed to complete an anger management class and to pay the victim 
restitution.  bR.28; bR.99:2.  If Becker successfully complied with these 
conditions, the charge against him would be dismissed.  bR.99:5. 
 While Becker and the State did not agree to a final sum for restitution, 
the State gave Becker a copy of a letter Mr. Turner had written requesting 
restitution for $1,143:  $39 for a vision exam, $624 for pair of replacement 
eyeglasses, and $480 for lost wages.  See bR.68; bR.99:2, 10; bR.95:5, 8-9.   
 At the plea hearing, Becker admitted that he had “attempted to hit his 
neighbor with the handle of a shovel during an argument regarding some 
loose dogs.”  bR.99:7-8.  He confirmed that the plea in abeyance agreement 
required him to complete an anger management course and to pay the 
victim restitution.  See bR.99:2.   
 When the trial court expressed concern about accepting a plea in 
abeyance agreement that did not include a restitution amount, Becker 
affirmed that the plea in abeyance agreement required him to pay full 
restitution.  See bR.99:2.  He further agreed that the trial court would 
determine the final restitution amount and he would be required to pay it, 
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even if he ultimately disagreed with the trial court’s determination.  See 
bR.99:2-3, 9 (Becker affirming trial court’s statement that “everyone 
understands the payment of restitution as ordered by this court . . . will be 
one of the conditions . . . [e]ven if Mr. Becker ultimately disagrees with what 
that is”). 
 The trial court accepted Becker’s plea, held it in abeyance for 24 
months, and ordered him to complete an anger management course and to 
“pay full restitution.”  bR.21; bR.99:8-10.    
 Following the plea hearing, the State submitted a motion for 
restitution, requesting $663.01—a little over half the original estimate 
because it did not seek restitution for Mr. Turner’s lost wages.  See bR.32; 
bR.95:5-6.  The State included a “Subrogation Notice” for the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime (UOVC).  See bR.34-37.  The documents itemized the 
$663.01 to show that the UOVC had paid the victim $39.00 and $624.01 for 
“Medically Necessary Device[s].”  bR.36.  The documents also included 
Becker’s name, the date and address of the assault, the police report 
number, the responding officer’s name, the victim’s name, the third district 
court’s case number, and the UOVC claim number.  See bR.35-37.   
 Becker objected to the State’s restitution request.  See bR.38, 42.  At a 
subsequent hearing, Becker argued that the UOVC’s documents were 
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insufficient because they did not state what the “medically necessary 
device” was or “who provided the services.”  bR.95:4-5.  Although 
subpoenaed, Mr. Turner did not appear at the hearing.  See bR.95:6. 
 The State explained that the “medically necessary device[s]” were for 
Mr. Turner’s $39 vision exam and $624 pair of replacement eyeglasses.  
bR.95:5-6; bR.68.  The State presented Mr. Turner’s letter to the trial court.  
See id.      
 Becker, however, insisted that the UOVC must have had “additional 
information.”  R.95:8.  He asked for another hearing so that he could “try to 
obtain that information.”  R.95:11.  While the trial court believed that “on its 
face this appears to be a proper restitution claim,” it ordered another 
hearing to give Becker “some time to see if in fact this is not what it claims 
to be.”  R.95:17.   But the trial court cautioned that “I am not going to have a 
hearing where I second-guess whether or not [the UOVC] should have paid 
that . . . .”  bR.95:12.  Instead, the hearing would address only whether there 
was “sufficient documentation to connect it to this criminal conduct.”  Id. 
The court explained that unless Becker came up with something that 
undercut the UOVC’s decision to reimburse Mr. Turner, it planned to order 
restitution in the amount of $663.01.  See id.  
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 Before the second restitution hearing, Becker served the UOVC with a 
subpoena duces tecum. See bR.45-46. The UOVC responded with 
documents showing that it had reimbursed the victim for an eye exam and 
eyeglasses, but the documents were “no more in detail than what” it had 
already provided.  bR.96:4.  
   At the second restitution hearing, Becker argued once again that the 
State’s request for restitution lacked evidentiary foundation because “the 
only thing that’s formal” was the UOVC’s notice that it had paid the victim 
$663.01 for unspecified “medically necessary device[s].”  bR.96:5.  Becker 
further argued that the State had not shown a causal nexus between his 
criminal conduct and Mr. Turner’s economic loss because Becker “did not 
admit to any conduct that would result in damages to Mr. Turner’s eye or 
his eyeglasses . . . .” bR.96:5.   
 The trial court rejected Becker’s arguments and granted the State’s 
motion for restitution in the amount of $663.01.  See bR.84; bR.96:14.  Becker 
appealed.  See bR.91.2 
                                              
2 On May 6, 2016, the trial court ordered Becker to appear and show 
cause why his plea in abeyance should not be terminated, judgment of 
conviction be entered, and his sentence be imposed.  A hearing is scheduled 
for August 8, 2016.  See Third Judicial District court docket, case number 
131902981.   
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2. The court of appeals’ decision. 
 The court of appeals also dismissed Becker’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See State v. Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173 (Addendum 
A).  Following Mooers, it concluded that because “Becker has not been 
sentenced and a conviction has not yet been entered against him, there is no 
final order from which Becker may appeal.”  Id. at ¶9.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The court of appeals correctly dismissed Mooers’s and Becker’s 
appeals because it did not have jurisdiction to consider them.  For direct 
appeals, Utah appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only final 
judgments or orders.  The restitution orders here were not final.  Rather, 
they were conditions of pleas in abeyance—which by design and for 
defendants’ benefits are not final judgments because neither judgments of 
conviction nor sentences are entered.   
 While in a typical case, a restitution order may be appealed 
independently of conviction and sentence, this is not true in the plea in 
abeyance context.  This is because restitution orders become part of a 
convicted defendant’s sentence—the final judgment—but in the plea in 
abeyance context, a defendant has been neither convicted nor sentenced. 
And the reasoning for allowing convicted defendants to independently 
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appeal restitution orders does not apply in the plea in abeyance context—
there is no appeal that would otherwise be delayed by awaiting a final 
restitution order.     
 But defendants like Mooers and Becker are not without an avenue of 
appellate review.  Indeed, defendants may seek interlocutory review of 
restitution orders imposed as conditions of pleas in abeyance.  And if 
interlocutory review is foreclosed by law, they may seek extraordinary relief 
under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  Moreover, they may always 
appeal as a matter of right if their pleas in abeyance are terminated and 
their convictions become final.   
 This is fair.  Mooers and Becker negotiated the terms of their plea in 
abeyance agreements.  And in doing so, they were guaranteed the 
opportunity to avoid criminal penalties to which they would have 
otherwise been subject.   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
MOOERS’S AND BECKER’S APPEALS BECAUSE UTAH’S 
APPELLATE COURTS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
CONSIDER NON-FINAL ORDERS ON DIRECT APPEAL 
 Mooers and Becker argue that “the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over [the] direct appeals of their 
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restitution orders.”  Br.Pet. 9 (capitalization removed).  They contend that a 
restitution order is always final—and thus appealable as a matter of right—
even when it is entered as a condition of a non-final plea in abeyance 
agreement.  See Br.Pet. 9-19.  And while Mooers and Becker concede that 
defendants can seek discretionary review of non-final orders, they contend 
that such review is inadequate because it “would either come too late or not 
at all.”  Br.Pet. 19-20.   
 The court of appeals correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals because their restitution orders are 
not final judgments.  Rather, they are conditions of Mooers’s and Becker’s 
plea in abeyance agreements—which by their very nature are not final.  
Appellate courts cannot act without a grant of jurisdiction.  And there is 
none granting an appeal as of right here.  But discretionary review is 
eminently reasonable for pleas in abeyance; Mooers and Becker negotiated 
the terms of their agreements and received the benefit of the possibility of 
having no conviction or sentence if they successfully fulfill the terms of 
those agreements.   
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A. A restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in 
abeyance is not appealable as a matter of right because it is 
not a final order. 
 Under the Utah Constitution, criminal defendants have “‘the right to 
appeal in all cases.’” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶6, 251 P.3d 829 (quoting 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12).  But this right is not absolute.  Rather, the right to 
appeal “must be positively recognized by statute or a constitutional 
provision.”  Id.  See also State v. Harrison, 2011 UT 74, ¶8, 269 P.3d 133, 136 
(same); State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1983) (“Appellate jurisdiction 
. . . may exist by virtue of a constitutional grant or by statute.”); State v. 
Olsen, 115 P. 968, 969 (Utah 1911) (“[T]he right of appeal is purely statutory 
and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision.”).  
As relevant here, a criminal defendant’s right to a direct appeal lies only in 
final judgments.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(1) (West 2012) (providing 
that “defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . a final judgment 
of conviction, whether by verdict or plea”); Utah R. App. P. 3 (“An appeal 
may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments”). For 
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everything else, the defendant may appeal only by permission.  §77-18a-
1(2).3   
 Likewise, appellate court jurisdiction is conferred by statute or 
constitutional provision.  See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶35 n.6, 100 P.3d 
1177 (“‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction . . . is the authority granted through 
constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies.’”).  See 
also Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶6 (same); Harrison, 2011 UT 74, ¶8 (same); Taylor, 
664 P.2d at 441 (same).  Indeed, appellate courts “‘cannot conjure 
jurisdiction.’”  State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶21, 342 P.3d 789 (quoting State v. 
Lara, 2005 UT 70, ¶10, 124 P.3d 234).   
 For direct appeals, appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear it only if 
it is taken from a final judgment or order.  See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, 
¶¶10, 15, 37 P.3d 1070.  An order is final only if it disposes of the case as to 
all parties and “finally dispose[s] of the subject-matter of the litigation on 
the merits of the case.”  Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶9, 5 P.3d 
                                              
 3 There is a statutory right to appeal other orders that this appeal does 
not implicate.  See Utah Code Annotated § §77-18a-1(b) through (d).  There 
is also an exception to the final judgment rule for direct appeals that does 
not apply here.  Utah’s appellate courts may have jurisdiction to consider a 
direct appeal from a nonfinal order if there are multiple parties and 
multiple claims and the appellant satisfies the criteria of rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶15, 37 P.3d 1070.   
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649 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  See also State ex rel. 
J.M.S., 2010 UT App 326, ¶12, 246 P.3d 1188 (holding that order removing 
children from father’s custody was not final, appealable order because 
“further judicial proceedings are required to determine [children’s] ultimate 
placement” and father still had chance to regain custody). “In a criminal 
case, it is ‘the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which 
the appellant has the right to appeal.’”  State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶4, 57 
P.3d 1065 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis 
in original).4   
 By design and for the defendant’s benefit, a trial court’s order 
accepting a plea in abeyance is not a final judgment because neither a 
judgment of conviction nor a sentence is entered.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
2a-2(1) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that court will “hold the plea in 
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor 
impose sentence upon the defendant”).  Instead, the trial court holds a 
guilty or no contest plea in “abeyance” “on condition that the defendant 
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement.”  Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-1 (West Supp. 2012).  One condition a 
                                              
4 As discussed in subpoint I.B below, appellate courts also have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals of non-final orders, but only when they grant 
defendants permission to appeal. 
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plea in abeyance may require is that the defendant pay restitution.  See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (providing that “terms of a plea in abeyance 
agreement may include: . . . (b) an order that the defendant pay restitution 
to the victims of the defendant’s actions”). 
 If the defendant successfully fulfills his plea in abeyance conditions—
including paying restitution—the trial court may either “reduce the degree 
of offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence” or “allow 
withdrawal of defendant’s plea and order the dismissal of the case.”  Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2) (West. Supp. 2012).  If the defendant does not 
successfully fulfill the plea in abeyance conditions, the trial court “may 
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was 
entered.”  Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (West Supp. 2012).   
 As the court of appeals has explained, a plea in abeyance does not 
result in a final judgment unless and until a conviction is entered or the case 
is dismissed: 
a plea in abeyance anticipates further action by the trial court, 
and accordingly is not final. In other words, the case remains 
open until the trial court takes further action to either enter a 
conviction for the pleaded-to crime or a lesser crime, or 
dismisses the case. Until that time, the case is in limbo and the 
defendant’s status is unresolved. 
 
State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, ¶17, 21 P.3d 249.   
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 Consequently, the “law is well-settled that, because there has been no 
final judgment, a direct appeal cannot be taken from a plea in abeyance 
agreement.”  State v. Millward, 2014 UT App 174, ¶2, 332 P.3d 400 (quoting 
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ¶14, 51 P.3d 55, cert. denied 59 P.3d 603).  
See also Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶18, 359 P.3d 592 (“Had the Legislature 
intended a plea in abeyance to constitute a conviction . . . it would have so 
provided in the statute authorizing such pleas.  But it did not.  Rather, the 
statute provides to the contrary.”); State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 n.7 
(Utah App. 1996) (“The plain language of these statutes reveals that a plea 
in abeyance is not a final adjudication.”), cert. denied 929 P.2d 350.  As a 
result, defendants cannot take a direct appeal to contest the conditions of 
their pleas in abeyance.   
 Here, there are no final judgments because neither Mooers nor Becker 
have been convicted or sentenced.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(1).  
Instead, the trial courts have entered orders accepting their plea in abeyance 
agreements. See mR.15; bR.21; Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-1.  And if Mooers 
and Becker fulfill the conditions of their plea in abeyance agreements—
including paying restitution—the trial courts may withdraw their pleas and 
dismiss their cases.  See bR.99:5 (“If you do what is ordered as the 
conditions of this plea in abeyance, ultimately that [charge] will be 
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dismissed.”); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2).  If they do not fulfill the 
conditions, the trial court will enter judgments of conviction and sentence 
them.  See mR.137:5 (advising Mooer that if he failed to fulfill the conditions, 
it “would mean you would come back here and the guilty plea would be 
entered and you would be sentenced”).  And in that case, they will have an 
appeal of right. 
 One of the conditions in both Mooers’s and Becker’s plea in abeyance 
agreements is that they pay restitution.  See mR.15; mR.137:5-6; bR.21; 
bR.99:2-3, 9.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (providing that “an order that 
the defendant pay restitution” is a “term [] of a plea in abeyance 
agreement”) (emphasis added).  But that is merely a condition for them to 
avoid a final judgment or order.  The court of appeals thus correctly held 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s and Becker’s direct appeals.   
1. A restitution order entered as a condition of a plea in 
abeyance is not a separate, final order. 
 Although pleas in abeyance are not final, Mooers and Becker contend 
that a restitution order is always final and directly appealable, even when it 
is imposed as a condition of a non-final plea in abeyance agreement.  See 
Br.Pet. 9-19.  In support, they rely on State v. Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, 208 
P.3d 543, and Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, 359 P.3d 592.  Neither case, 
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however, supports the proposition that a restitution order imposed as a 
condition of a plea in abeyance is directly appealable.   
 It is true that in a typical case, a restitution order is final and 
separately appealable.  See Salt Lake City v. Ausbeck, 2011 UT App 269, ¶4 
n.2, 274 P.3d 991; Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 618 (2010) (observing 
that “it is not surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed 
from the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence [and also] . . . 
from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution”).  But this is 
because when a defendant is convicted (either by verdict or by pleading 
guilty or no contest), restitution becomes part of his sentence—the final 
judgment against him.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (providing that 
“in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
the defendant make restitution”) (emphasis added); State v. Garner, 2005 UT 
6, ¶17, 106 P.3d 729 (explaining that restitution order is part of sentence). 
In a plea in abeyance, however, the restitution order cannot be part of 
the defendant’s sentence because he has not been—and may never be—
sentenced.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (providing that court will “hold 
the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the 
defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant”).  Instead, the 
restitution order is simply a non-final condition of his plea in abeyance 
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agreement, the successful completion of which will usually mean there will 
be no judgment against the defendant at all.  See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-
3(5) (providing that “an order that the defendant pay restitution” is a “term 
[] of a plea in abeyance agreement”) (emphasis added).     
 A convicted defendant may separately appeal a restitution order that 
is part of his sentence because restitution may not be determined for up to 
one year after sentencing—outside the time usually allotted to file an appeal 
from a final judgment.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302(2)(b) (West 
Supp. 2012) (providing that trial court shall determine restitution “as part of 
the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after 
sentencing”).5  It thus “makes sense” to permit a convicted defendant to 
immediately proceed to direct appeal on his claims about his conviction and 
sentence and separately appeal any complaints about his restitution order. 
Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618.  “[O]therwise,” his appeal would be delayed and he 
“would be forced to wait . . . before seeking review of [his] conviction”—
indeed, up to one year.  Id.  See also Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶¶15-16 (explaining 
                                              
5 The current version of the Crime Victims Restitution Act has 
removed this language, instead requiring the State to submit restitution 
requests within one year after sentencing.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-
38a-302(5)(d)(i) (West 2016). 
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that convicted defendants may separately appeal restitution order so as not 
to “significantly delay[]” right to appeal).   
 But this concern does not apply in the plea in abeyance context.  In 
fact, because a recipient of a plea in abeyance has not been convicted, there 
is no conviction for him to appeal.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-2(1) 
(West Supp. 2012) (providing that court will “hold the plea in abeyance and 
not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence 
upon the defendant”).  Only if he fails to successfully fulfill his plea in 
abeyance conditions will the trial court enter judgment and conviction and 
impose sentence.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(2) (West Supp. 2012).  
But this would be after his restitution condition has already been ordered, 
not the other way around.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-1 (West Supp. 
2012) (providing that plea in abeyance conditions must be set forth in plea 
in abeyance agreement).  Thus, the conundrum that justifies treating a 
restitution order entered as part of a sentence—delaying the remainder of 
the appeal—does not exist in a plea in abeyance because there is no appeal 
that would otherwise be delayed by awaiting a final restitution order.  
 Mooers and Becker argue, however, that it “defies . . . logic” that a 
defendant who has received a plea in abeyance must wait until after he has 
been convicted and sentenced to receive direct review of this restitution 
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condition.  Br.Pet. 15.  But this is true for any other condition of his plea in 
abeyance agreement.  Because the plea had not been entered and no 
sentence imposed, the plea itself is interlocutory.  And if the whole is 
interlocutory, so are its parts.  Indeed, Mooers and Becker have not 
shown—even argued—why restitution orders should be treated differently 
than any other condition of a plea in abeyance agreement.  While there is 
much “at stake” in complying with a restitution condition, this is true for 
every condition of a plea in abeyance agreement.  Br.Pet. 14 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Each equally and independently puts the 
defendant at risk of a criminal conviction and sentence if he does not 
comply.6  Br.Pet. 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  See e.g., State v. 
Martin, 2012 UT App 208, ¶3, 283 P.3d 1066 (explaining that Martin failed to 
fulfill plea in abeyance condition that he replace chain link fence and replant 
elm tree and shrubs by “licensed third party”) (emphasis removed).  
                                              
6 Many possible common conditions of a plea in abeyance—like 
restitution—require the defendant to pay substantial monthly sums, such as 
paying child support, paying for a “remedial or rehabilitative program,” or 
maintaining a residence.  Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(5)(c) (West Supp. 
2012).  See also Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(5)(d) (providing that plea in 
abeyance may contain any condition that could be imposed as a condition of 
probation). 
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 The court of appeals thus correctly concluded that Mooers’s and 
Becker’s appeals were not final and the court accordingly had no 
jurisdiction to consider them.   
 Other jurisdictions have come to the same conclusion.  See In re T.C., 
210 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1432-1433 (Cal. App. 2012) (dismissing direct appeal 
of restitution order where juvenile court “deferred entry of judgment” and 
observing juvenile could appeal if judgment is subsequently entered); State 
v. Cameron, 81 P.3d 442, 444 (Kan. App. 2003) (dismissing appeal of 
diversion agreement because it was not final judgment, which “requires 
both a conviction and a sentence”); State v. Brown, 2012 WL 1521544U, *1-2 
(La. App. 2012) (dismissing State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
Brown had not been convicted where trial court deferred judgment); State v. 
Castaldo, 638 A.2d 845, 848 (N.J. 1994) (holding that Castaldo had no “appeal 
as of right” from restitution condition imposed in diversionary program 
because defendants “may appeal from an adverse determination only after 
judgment of conviction”); State v. Collins, 2008 WL 2579170U, *1-2 (Tenn. 
App. 2008) (dismissing direct appeal of restitution order imposed as 
condition of “judicial diversion” because there was no final judgment and 
explaining proper avenue for appellate review was interlocutory review); 
State v. Norris, 47 S.W. 3d 457, 461-463 (Tenn. App. 2000) (holding that 
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appellant had no appeal of right when granted judicial diversion because 
there was no final judgment); State v. Moore, 2009 WL 2342905U, *1 (Tenn. 
App. 2009) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction from judicial diversion 
where Moore contested whether interest could be awarded as part of 
restitution); Quaglia v. State, 906 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding 
that modification of terms of deferred adjudication are not directly 
appealable); McLean v. State, 2011 WL 192719U (Tex. App. 2011) (per 
curiam) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction from appeal of condition 
of deferred adjudication).   
 The cases upon which Mooers and Becker rely—State v. Gibson and 
Meza v. State—do not change this conclusion.  In fact, neither supports the 
proposition that a restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in 
abeyance agreement is directly appealable.   
 Gibson entered into a plea in abeyance agreement.  See Gibson, 2009 
UT App 108, ¶3.  As here, one condition required her to pay restitution.  See 
id.  Because “there was a dispute over the amounts” of restitution, the trial 
court set the restitution amount after a hearing.  See id.  Gibson moved to 
amend the court’s restitution order, but the trial court denied it.  See id. at 
¶4.  The State later filed a motion for order to show cause why Gibson’s plea 
in abeyance should not be terminated and judgment of conviction be 
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entered because Gibson had failed to pay restitution as required.  See id. at 
¶5.  Before hearing the State’s motion, Gibson filed a motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea, arguing that her plea was not knowing or voluntary when 
the restitution figure was uncertain at the time she pleaded guilty.  See id. at 
¶6.  The trial court denied her motion.  See id.  The court then heard the 
State’s motion for order to show cause and terminated Gibson’s plea in 
abeyance agreement, entered her guilty plea, and sentenced her.  See id. at 
¶7.  Gibson timely appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea.  See id.  
 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Gibson’s plea had been 
knowing and voluntary.  See id. at ¶¶11-15.  In its discussion, the court 
noted that Gibson had the right to a restitution hearing “and also ha[d] the 
right to appeal the resulting determination,” and “ultimately chose not to 
exercise her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to 
amend.” Id. at ¶15.  In a footnote, it stated that the “Crime Victims 
Restitution Act specifies that a judgment under that act has the same effect 
as an ordinary judgment.”  ¶15 n.5 (citing Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-
401(4)).      
 These statements do not support the proposition that Gibson could 
have directly appealed the trial court’s restitution determination before her 
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plea in abeyance was terminated and her conviction was entered.  Gibson 
could directly appeal the trial court’s restitution determination because she 
was convicted and sentenced.  Indeed, all interlocutory orders become final 
once a defendant has been sentenced.  See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶4 
(explaining that sentence in criminal case “constitutes a final judgment from 
which the appellant has the right to appeal”).  And once there is a final 
judgment, a defendant may appeal any error in the criminal process, as long 
as it is procedurally proper.  The Gibson court thus correctly noted that 
Gibson could have claimed error in the trial court’s restitution 
determination in her present appeal.  Cf. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ¶14 
(dismissing defendant’s appeal from plea in abeyance without prejudice 
and recognizing that he could raise same claims of error should judgment 
become final).      
 Neither does Gibson’s observation that restitution orders have the 
same effect as an ordinary civil judgment turn an interlocutory restitution 
condition into a final judgment that is appealable as a matter of right.  As 
stated, Gibson’s plea in abeyance had been terminated, her conviction had 
been entered, and she had been sentenced.  Gibson, 2009 UT App, ¶7.  The 
restitution award was thus at that time a final judgment.  Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
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require all judgments—including civil ones—to be final before they can be 
directly appealed.  The Crime Victims Restitution Act’s provision allowing 
crime victims to collect restitution awards as civil judgments thus does not 
change this final judgment rule.  And as the Mooers court noted, the purpose 
of this provision is to give victims an avenue to collect restitution owed to 
them, not to invoke appellate jurisdiction.  See Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 
¶¶16-17.   
 Likewise, Meza does not support the proposition that restitution 
orders imposed as a condition of a plea in abeyance agreement can be 
directly appealed.  Meza addressed whether a defendant who successfully 
completed a plea in abeyance and had his plea withdrawn may proceed 
under the Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA).  Meza held that he could 
not because he had no conviction.  2015 UT 70, ¶¶8, 16.  Meza explained that 
the PRCA did not explicitly make an exception to the “general rule that a 
successfully completed plea in abeyance is not a conviction.”  Id. at ¶17.  
The Meza court noted three “explicit exceptions” where a plea in abeyance 
was treated as a conviction.  Id.  One of these exceptions was the Crime 
Victims Restitution Act, which defines a “conviction” as a judgment of guilt, 
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plea of guilty, or plea of no contest.  Id. (citing Utah Code Annotated § 77-
38a-102(1)).7     
 But whether Meza correctly observed that the Crime Victims 
Restitution Act treats a plea in abeyance as a conviction for restitution 
purposes does not matter.  Simply because the Act may treat a plea in 
abeyance as a conviction for one purpose—ensuring crime victims receive 
restitution—does not mean that it must be treated as a conviction for all 
purposes.  Indeed, Meza made clear that “except in those cases where a 
statute specifically provides otherwise, a successfully completed plea in 
abeyance is not a conviction and cannot be treated as such.”  Id. at ¶14.  The 
Crime Victims Restitution Act does not purport to confer jurisdiction on 
appellate courts.   
 But even if Gibson and Meza could be construed as supporting 
Mooers’s and Becker’s position, the court of appeals correctly concluded 
                                              
7 The two other exceptions Meza recognized were Utah Code 
Annotated § 17-16-10.5(2)(c) (“Entry of a plea in abeyance is the equivalent 
of a conviction for purposes of [removing public officer from office] even if 
the charge is later dismissed pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement”) 
and Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-301.7(1) (“As used in this section, 
‘conviction’ means a conviction by plea or by verdict, including a plea of 
guilty or no contest that is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas 
in Abeyance, regardless of whether the charge was, or is, subsequently 
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.”).  
See Meza, 2015 UT 70, ¶17 n.3. 
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that the language Mooers and Becker rely on was nonbinding dicta.  See 
Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶14. Dicta are “judicial statements that are 
unnecessary to the resolution of the case.”  Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates, 2016 
UT App 131, ¶14 n.4, __Utah Adv. Rep. __.  Nonbinding, or obiter dicta, 
“‘refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an 
aside,’ such as a ‘statement made by a court for use in argument, 
illustration, analogy or suggestion.’”  Id. (quoting Exelon Corp. v. Department 
of Revenue, 917 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Ill. 2009)).  In contrast, binding, or judicial 
dicta is “an expression of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel 
and deliberately passed upon by the court,” Exelon, 917 N.E.2d at 907; for 
example, a statement “‘deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and 
bar upon a point of statutory construction not theretofore considered by the 
Supreme Court,” ex parte Harrison, 741 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).  
While the court of appeals must follow judicial dicta, it is not required 
to follow orbiter dicta.  Ortega, 2016 UT App 131, ¶14 n.4  See also State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (providing that “lower courts are 
obliged to follow . . . any ‘judicial dicta’ that may be pronounced by the 
higher court”).   
Gibson’s and Meza’s statements were nonbinding orbiter dicta.  They 
did not address the question posed here:  whether a defendant can appeal 
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as a matter of right a restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in 
abeyance agreement.   They were merely “‘statement[s] made by a court for 
use in argument, illustration, analogy or suggestion’” on another point. 
Ortega, 2016 Utah App 131, ¶14 n.4 (quoting Exelon Corp., 917 N.E.2d at 907).  
They thus do not control and the court of appeals correctly concluded it did 
not have jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals.      
 B. Alternative methods of review are both the only 
avenues of review and fair. 
   Defendants finally argue that the alternative methods of review are a 
“poor fit” because they are discretionary.  Br.Pet. 19-20 (capitalization 
removed).  But appellate courts “‘cannot conjure jurisdiction.’”  Collins, 2014 
UT 61, ¶21 (quoting State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, ¶10).  Their power to review 
an appeal exists only by a statutory or constitutional grant.  Clark, 2011 UT 
23, ¶6.  There is none here that gives the court of appeals power to review 
non-final restitution conditions on direct appeal.      
 But defendants like Mooers and Becker are not wholly foreclosed 
from appellate review.  They can timely move to withdraw their pleas and 
appeal the denial of that motion.  See Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 
Supp. 2012) (allowing defendants to move to withdraw their plea in plea in 
abeyance context 30 days after pleading).  They can seek interlocutory 
review of the trial court’s restitution order under rule 5, Utah Rules of 
-35- 
Appellate Procedure.  See Utah R. App. P. 5 (providing mechanism for 
appellate review of non-final orders). And if interlocutory review is 
foreclosed by law, they can seek extraordinary relief under rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  And while both are discretionary, Mooers and 
Becker cite no reason the appellate courts would be ungenerous with 
granting discretionary review, especially where appellate review is unlikely 
without it. 
 Further, they can always appeal the restitution award as a matter of 
right if their convictions are entered and become final.  Or, they could have 
assured an appeal of right by declining a plea in abeyance in the first place. 
 This is eminently reasonable.  A plea in abeyance “offers a defendant 
the opportunity to avoid criminal penalties to which the defendant would 
have otherwise been subject.”  Layton City v. Stevenson, 2014 UT 37, ¶42.  
“While the choice to accept judicial diversion may jeopardize a defendant’s 
right to raise a legal issue, the quid pro quo is that the defendant who accepts 
diversion can emerge from the process without a conviction.”  Collins, 2008 
WL 2579170U, *2.  Indeed, a plea in abeyance is negotiated and “a trial court 
may not impose [a plea in abeyance] except with the defendant’s consent.”  
Norris, 47 S.W.3d at 461-463. 
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 In effect, by accepting a plea in abeyance agreement, Mooers and 
Becker agreed to waive their right to a direct appeal of their restitution 
conditions.  Cf. State v. Taufui, 2015 UT App 118, ¶15 (explaining that 
Taufui’s guilty plea operated “as a waiver of the right to a direct appeal of 
the conviction on the crime charged”); Gailey, 2016 UT 35, ¶2 (same); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(c) (providing that “any challenge to guilty plea not 
made within” thirty days of pleading guilty cannot be directly appealed but 
“shall” be pursued through the PCRA); State v. Nicholls I, 2006 UT 76, ¶6 
(holding that because Nicholls’ challenge to guilty plea was outside the 
statutory time period, any challenge “can only be pursued under” the 
PCRA.).  That waiver purchased for them a guarantee of no conviction for 
their admitted criminal acts so long as they fulfill their obligations under the 
plea agreements.  They cannot be now heard to complain. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
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 Respectfully submitted on August 4, 2016. 
 SEAN D. REYES 
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